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Commentary on Abolish the Article 9 Filing
System by Professor Peter Alces
Edwin E. Smith*
Professor Peter Alces, in his article Abolish the Article 9 Fil-
ing System,1 questions whether the costs of the current filing
system outweigh its benefits and then predicts, as he puts it, a
"bleak future," with the problems of the current filing system
being "exacerbated rather than corrected by developing technol-
ogies and law revision initiatives."2 Although one might agree
that the cost/benefit analysis is key in judging the filing system,
some factors on both the cost and the benefit sides are not
stressed in Professor Alces's article.
I. THE COSTS
Consider the cost side of the ratio. One may first question
whether it is correct or appropriate, as part of the revisions pro-
cess with which so many of us are involved today, to focus upon
the costs of the current system in determining whether the cost/
benefit ratio exceeds, or is less than, one to one.3 Of course, I do
not challenge directly the accuracy of the statistical data set
forth in Professor Alces's article as to the likely current cost of
the filing system in relation to overall legal charges.4 We must
remember, however, that those costs cover various legal tasks.
At the credit origination stage, these tasks consist of ob-
taining the correct information from the debtor as to where to
* Edwin E. Smith is a partner in the Boston office of Bingham, Dana &
Gould and was a member of the UCC Article 9 Study Committee. As a Massa-
chusetts Uniform Law Commissioner, he is currently serving on the UCC Arti-
cle 9 Drafting Committee.
1. Peter A. Alces, Abolish the Article 9 Filing System, 79 MUM. L. REv.
679 (1995).
2. Id. at 681.
3. Id. at 681-93.
4. After all, Professor Alces's figures came from my own'law firm and from
an attorney who was a member of the practice group that I supervised. See
Letter from Meredith S. Jackson, Associate, Bingham, Dana & Gould, to Profes-
sor Peter A. Alces, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary
1-4 (May 28, 1992) (on file with author).
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search and where to file, arranging for the appropriate searches
to be made, reviewing the search results, completing the various
financing statements, arranging for execution of the financing
statements, and arranging for the filings to be made in the
proper recording offices. To the extent that, after the loan clos-
ing, further changes take place (e.g., mergers of existing compa-
nies within the corporate group, acquisition of new assets,
changes of names, establishing new offices, and the like), law-
yers must perform similar tasks.
We must also remember that the transactions for which the
data were supplied largely related to national credits involving
loans to corporate groups and multistate transactions.5 While
each of the enumerated tasks may entail a cost, that cost is cer-
tainly multiplied to the extent that the process must be repeated
for each state in which the debtor or a guaranteeing affiliate has
assets or a business location. Although I have not done any em-
pirical analysis of these particular matters, my strong and in-
stinctual guess is that, if these transactions involved a single
state, and a single location within that state, where the secured
party had to file to perfect its security interest in the debtor's
assets, filing costs would be dramatically reduced. If the filing
system were reformed to permit such a single filing for multi-
state transactions, one cannot help but believe that this reform
would significantly lessen the cost side of Professor Alces's ratio.
Transition costs constitute a second variable in the cost side
of the ratio. Although Professor Alces defines his ratio in terms
of whether we would invent the same filing system today if we
were to start over,6 we cannot ignore that we do not have a clean
slate today and that there are costs of actually moving to a dif-
ferent system. "Fine tuning" the filing system may have mini-
mal costs. Moving, however, to a state-funded "priority
insurance" system, as Professor Alces suggests, 7 may have sub-
stantial costs.
If a state-funded "priority insurance" system were created,
for example, states would be likely to view the filing system as
an operation with significant contingent liabilities that they
must fund, or for which they must establish reserves. Questions
would arise as to credit risk to those who use the system and
who have claims to collect. Furthermore, insurance coverage
5. Alces, supra note 1, at 690; Letter from Meredith S. Jackson to Peter A.
Alces, supra note 4, at 3-4.
6. Alces, supra note 1, at 679-80.
7. Id. at 707-13.
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and even bond ratings would become major concerns. Adjust-
ments like these would have their own transition costs.
Finally, many of the empirical uncertainties that we have
today may lead us to question whether the filing system that
Professor Alces envisages will, in fact, be cheaper than the cur-
rent system.8 Consider, for example, how a state would deter-
mine what "premium" to charge for priority insurance.
Normally it would look to the empirical evidence of loss attribu-
table to the current filing system, the very same evidence that
Professor Alces recognizes is largely lacking today. 9 It would
use that information, if it could find it, to adjust premiums not
only to cover potential losses but also to fund operating costs
and, if it could, to make a profit. Where the information is "soft,"
as is likely here, and given the likelihood that a state would be
risk averse, a state might compensate for the uncertain risk by
charging a higher premium. Those secured parties relying on
their priority secured position would, of course, pay that pre-
mium and pass it on to their debtors as part of the price of the
credit. One wonders whether the cost of that premium charged
would be less than the cost of obtaining priority under the filing
system as reformed. Debtors might demand an examination of
the filing offices' profits for which the debtors are paying. There
might be pressure for states to regulate those profits, as in the
case of public utilities. My fear is that by moving from a system
where commercial risks are borne by commercial parties, who
are risk takers, to a system where these risks are borne by state
government, we will not create a cheaper system but instead a
more expensive bureaucracy.
II. THE BENEFITS
What about the benefit side of the ratio? Professor Alces ar-
gues that the real benefit of the filing system is not to provide
general credit information relating to the debtor.10 It is not to
expose "secret liens" to unsecured creditors, and it is not to pre-
vent debtor fraud.'1 The benefit of the filing system is merely to
ensure a secured party priority against competing secured
claimants..2
8. Id. at 681.
9. Id. at 692 & n.41.
10. Id. at 694-701.
11. Id. at 702-04.
12. Id. at 704-07.
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I am persuaded that Professor Alces is largely right here.
The filing system cannot possibly protect an unsecured creditor
from having its claim "primed" by a secured party, because the
day after the unsecured creditor's search is made, the debtor
could grant a security interest and a filing could be made. In-
deed, that the filing system serves to perfect a secured party's
security interest against the bankruptcy trustee, as a hypotheti-
cal lien creditor, will drive the secured party to file. But such a
rule in itself would not necessarily cause the secured party to
search those files before extending credit. The secured party
searches largely, it appears, to assure the secured party of the
priority of its security interest in the collateral against compet-
ing secured claimants.
Even so, the filing system does provide other benefits by cre-
ating a means of public notice for transactions that the parties
might want to publicize. Some debtors appear comfortable with
financing statements in favor of their secured lenders, as a re-
corded means of assuring their suppliers that they have lines of
credit to pay for the goods shipped. Some lessors who do not
have the benefit of UCC section 2A-30813 in their jurisdiction
routinely file financing statements in sale and "true" leaseback
transactions. These filings minimize the risk that the transac-
tion will be viewed as fraudulent under a "seller in possession"
rule in that jurisdiction. Furthermore, filings may provide no-
tice by describing negative pledge clauses and subordination
terms. Professor Alces's article mentions my letter to him high-
lighting these filings. 14 He also states that buyers and investors
may look to the filing system to determine the identity of a
debtor's lender. 15 Certainly, some persons find all of this infor-
mation useful; otherwise, Dun & Bradstreet and others would
13. U.C.C. § 2A-308(3) (1990). This provision would insulate a transaction
in which the seller sold goods to a buyer, who then leased the goods back to the
seller under a true lease governed by Article 2A, from a "fraudulent retention"
attack by third-party creditors of a seller. This protection exists as long as the
buyer bought in good faith and for value. Id. In those jurisdictions that have
not passed Article 2A, the public disclosure of the transaction by way of a filing
of a UCC financing statement in favor of the buyer under UCC § 9-408 would
reduce the possibility that third-party creditors of the seller would be able to
claim that they were fraudulently misled by the seller's retention of those goods
as lessee.
14. See Alces, supra note 1, at 695-96 (discussing and quoting Letter from
Edwin E. Smith, Bingham, Dana & Gould, to Professor Peter A. Alces, Mar-
shall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary (July 31, 1991)).
15. Id. at 696.
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not routinely publish this information in response to credit
inquiries.
Hence, one might take issue with Professor Alces's argu-
ment that this information only clutters up the filing system.16
It clutters up the system for those who do not care about this
information; for others, the reverse is often true. In any event,
as technology advances, we learn to manage more and more in-
formation. In fact, today we expect more information to be read-
fly accessible to us, rather than less. Many of us would not
discourage the filing system from providing that information,
even as an ancillary goal.
I would suggest that, by adjusting Professor Alces's cost/
benefit ratio to reflect these cost and benefit factors not stressed
in his article, the costs of a "priority insurance" system would
outweigh its benefits. Conversely, the benefits of a reformed il-
ing system would outweigh the costs of either the current filing
system or the "priority insurance" system that Professor Alces
envisages.
16. Id. at 701, 706.
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